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Brass: Rule 407

FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 407: SHOULD IT
APPLY TO PRODUCTS LIABILITY?
INTRODUCTION

Federal Rule of Evidence 4071 states that evidence of
subsequent remedial measures taken by a defendant after an
accident has occurred is inadmissible at trial to prove negligence
or culpable conduct on the part of the defendant. 2 It is clear from
the plain language of the rule that it applies to causes of action
based on negligence. 3 It is less clear, however, whether Rule 407
applies to a strict products liability cause of action.
The federal courts of appeal are split. A clear majority of the
4
circuits has applied Rule 407 to strict products liability cases.
Two circuits, on the other hand, have come to the opposite

1. FED. R. EVID. 407. The rule provides:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously,
would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the
subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable
conduct in connection with the event. This rule does not require the
exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another
purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of
precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
1d.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1986);
Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1984); Grenada Steel
Indus., Inc., v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1983); Hall v.
American S.S. Co., 688 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1982); Josephs v. Harris Corp.,
677 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1982); Can v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d
848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981); Roy v. Star Chopper
Co., 584 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979).
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conclusion. 5 Furthermore, although New York does not follow
the Federal Rules of Evidence, it follows a common law rule that
seems to fall somewhere in between these two lines of
6
reasoning.
This Comment will focus on the split in the circuits and the
reasoning advanced by each circuit for its view on the issue. It
will also discuss the rule in New York and how it compares to
the interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 407 by the federal
courts. Part I of this Comment will analyze how Rule 407
advanced from common law into a federal rule of evidence, 7
provide a synopsis of the policy reasons that have been advanced
in favor of Rule 407,8 and discuss the first state case that decided
this issue. 9 Part II will define negligence and strict products
liability, 10 and will discuss the split in the federal circuit courts
on the issue of whether Rule 407 should be applied to actions
based on strict products liability. 1 1 Part III will advance the
common law rule that is followed in New York 12 and examine
how it compares to the interpretation of Rule 407 given by the
federal courts. 13 This Comment will conclude by stating that one
interpretation should be chosen, preferably that of the majority,
and followed by all courts, state and federal, to prevent forum
shopping and create uniformity in the law. 14

5. See, e.g., Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 716 F.2d 1322

(10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 958 (1984); Robbins v. Farmers
Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788 (8th Cir. 1977).
6. See Cover v. Cohen, 61 N.Y.2d 261, 461 N.E.2d 864, 473 N.Y.S.2d
378 (1984); Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114, 417 N.E.2d 545, 436
N.Y.S.2d 251 (1981).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 15-29.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 30-39.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 40-51.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 52-71.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 72-166.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 167-85.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 186-90.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 191-93.
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I. HISTORY
A. Advancementfrom Common Law to Statute
In 1892, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Columbia
& P.S.R. Co. v. Hmvthorne, 15 held that an alteration or a repair
to a product to make it safer, after it had injured a plaintiff, could
not be introduced at trial as evidence of a defendant's
negligence. 16 The Court listed several policy reasons why this
evidence should be excluded. 17 Evidence of this sort was
prejudicial as it would distract the jury from the real issue of the
case and would result in bias against the defendant. 18 Moreover,
the Court took the position that a change in the product made to
protect consumers in the future should not be deemed an
admission that the product was previously defective. 19 It
reasoned that this kind of evidence could not legitimately prove
that a defendant had been involved in negligent conduct before
the accident. 20
In 1948 this common law rule was codified in the Model Code
of Evidence as Rule 308.21 This version stated that precautions
which are taken to prevent the reoccurrence of an injury were not
admissible to prove negligence. 22 A second version was

15. 144 U.S. 202 (1892).
16. Id. at 206, 208.
17. Id. at 207.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 308 (1948). See Lev Dassin, Note,
Design Defects in the Rules Enabling Act: The Misapplication of Federal Rule
of Evidence 407 to Strict Liability, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 736, 744 (1990) ("The
Rule's prohibition first appeared in statutory form in 1948 in Rule 308 of the
Model Code of Evidence, and mentioned only negligence, saying nothing about
other forms of liability or 'culpable conduct.'").
22. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 308. This rule states:
Evidence of the taking of a precaution by a person to prevent the
repetition of a previous harm or the occurrence of a similar harm or the
evidence of the adoption of a plan requiring that such a precaution be
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contained in the 1952 publication of the Uniform Rules of
Evidence as Rule 51.23 This construction added the term
"culpable conduct" to the old rule and stated that evidence of

subsequent measures was not admissible to prove either
negligence or culpable conduct on the part of the defendant. 24
The version of this exclusionary rule used today is encompassed
in Federal Rule of Evidence 407, which went into effect in
1975.25 This version is similar to the 1952 version in that it
includes negligence as well as culpable conduct. 26 The rule was

expanded, however, to include certain circumstances in which the
evidence of subsequent remedial measures would be
admissible. 27 These circumstances include attempting to prove
control or ownership of the product, feasibility of the subsequent

measure, or to impeach the testimony of a witness. 28

Soon after the Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted, a
question arose in the federal courts as to whether Rule 407,

which had existed for many years in common law form, should
be interpreted to include actions based on strict products
liability. 29 Unfortunately, none of the additions to Rule 407 dealt

with this issue. In addition, Congress has not yet made any
changes in Rule 407 that address this issue, even though the
taken is inadmissible as tending to prove that his failure to take such a
precaution to prevent the previous harm was negligent.
Id.
23. UNIF. R. EvID. 51 (1952).
24. Id. This rule states that "Iwlhen after the occurrence of an event
remedial or precautionary measures are taken, which, if taken previously
would have tended to make the event less likely to occur, evidence of such
subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct
in connection with the event." Id. See Dassin, supra note 21, at 744 ("The
subsequent Rule 51 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, published in 1952,
added the phrase 'culpable conduct' without explanation.").
25. FED. R. EvID. 407. For full text of this rule, see supra note 1.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 57-58 (2d Cir.
1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982) ("On this appeal the Canns claim that
the court erred in ... its exclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial
measures as to the product liability claim.").
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debate has been ongoing since the 1970's. Furthermore, the
United States Supreme Court has yet to decide this issue. The
interpretation of the rule has been left up to the federal courts.
Consequently, the federal courts have provided several different
answers to this question.
B. Policy Behind FederalRule of Evidence 407
The Advisory Committee's Notes list several policies
supporting Rule 407.30 The first states that subsequent remedial
measures by a defendant after an accident has occurred should
not be admitted into evidence at trial because this type of
behavior is not a confession of either negligence or culpable
conduct by the defendant. 3 1 The Advisory Committee stated that
this type of action taken by a defendant is in accord with an
injury to the plaintiff that occurred through the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff or completely by accident. 32 The Notes
state that "[t]he rule rejects the notion that 'because the world
gets wiser as it gets older, therefore it was foolish before.'" 33
This notion is a well established policy that is used by most of
the federal courts that have addressed this issue. 34
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d 1273, 1276 (3d Cir. 1992)

(rejecting the notion that there is an admission of fault when remedial measures
are taken after an injury); Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1523
(1st Cir. 1991) (reiterating the policies of the rule and stating that "Ijlurors
would too readily equate subsequent design modifications with admissions of a
prior defective design"); Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463. 471
(7th Cir. 1984) ("ITlo infer negligence from such measures is to commit the
fallacy, to which juries have long been thought prone, of believing that
'because the world gets wiser as it gets older, therefore it was foolish
before.'"); Grenada Steel Indus., Inc., v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d
883, 888 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that changes in a product may be made if a
manufacturer discovered a better design or manufacturing process or to
institute a change that was planned before the injury); Werner v. Upjohn Co..
628 F.2d 848, 857 (4th Cir. 1980) (stating that a defendant who changes a
product may simply be taking precautionary measures on a product that did not
contain a defect), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981); Smyth v. Upjohn Co.,
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The second policy for Rule 407 is to motivate manufacturers to
take steps to improve their products and make them safer, instead
of dissuading them from making changes by presenting evidence
of these alterations at trial as proof of the manufacturer's
liability. 35 Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd. 3 6 stressed this
policy. 37 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Flaminio
reasoned that Rule 407 is necessary to insure that manufacturers
will not ignore defects of which they have become aware in fear
that the change will be used against them in court to prove that
38
they were responsible for the occurrence of the accident. Most
of the federal circuits agree with this reasoning.39
529 F.2d 803, 804 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[E]vidence of remedial action, being based
on hindsight, does not tend to show the defendant had failed to act with
reasonable care at an earlier period of time.").
35. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note.
36. 733 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1984).
37. Id. at 469. The court stated:
A major purpose of Rule 407 is to promote safety by removing
disincentive to make repairs ...

after an accident that would exist if the

accident victim could use those measures as evidence of the defendant's
liability. One might think it not only immoral but reckless for an
injurer, having been alerted by the accident to the existence of danger,
not to take steps to correct the danger. But accidents are low-probability
events. The probability of another accident may be much smaller than
the probability that the victim of the accident that has already occurred
will sue the injurer and, if permitted, will make devastating use at trial
of any measures that the injurer may have taken since the accident to
reduce the danger.
Id.
38. Id.

39. Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating
that a goal of Rule 407 is to encourage manufacturers to make subsequent
changes to their products to make them safer by not using these changes as
evidence of defective design); Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634 (9th Cir.
1986) (stating that the purpose of Rule 407 is to encourage manufacturers to
remedy dangerous defects in their products without fear that this will be used
against them in court); Grenada Steel Indus., Inc., v. Alabama Oxygen Co.,
695 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that voluntary improvement of a product
by a manufacturer should be encouraged and there is an assumption that this
improvement may be deterred if Rule 407 is not applied); Hall v. American
S.S. Co., 688 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1982) (stating that the rationale for Rule
407 is to exclude evidence of subsequent improvements in a lawsuit against a
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C. Beginning of Judicial Interpretation of the Exclusionary Rule
in Relation to Strict ProductsLiability
Before Federal Rule of Evidence 407 was enacted in 1975, the
Supreme Court of California was faced with the issue of whether
its state rule, which prevented evidence of subsequent remedial
measures from being admissible at trial, applied to actions based
on a theory of strict products liability. 40 The case of Ault v.
International Harvester Co., 4 1 which was the seminal case
regarding this issue, was decided based upon section 1151 of the
California Evidence Code. 42
In Ault, the plaintiff was injured when the car in which he was
a passenger suddenly went out of cotirol and veered off the road
into a canyon. 4 3 The plaintiff relied upon strict products liability,
negligence and breach of warranty due to a defective design in
defendant in order to ensure that these improvements will be made); Cann v.
Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that Rule 407 resulted
from a fear that manufacturers would not take subsequent remedial measures if
evidence of these measures could be used against them in court), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 960 (1982); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980)
(stating that Rule 407 was enacted in order to further the public policy of
encouraging defendants to change their products without fear that this change
will later be used against them at trial), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981).
40. Ault v. International Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1974).
41. Id.
42. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1151 (West 1966). The section states: "[wlhen,
after the occurrence of an event, remedial or precautionary measures are
taken, which, if taken previously, would have tended to make the event less
likely to occur, evidence of such subsequent measures is inadmissible to prove
negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event." Id. The wording
of Federal Rule of Evidence 407 is almost identical. See supra note 1.
43. Ault, 528 P.2d at 1150. At the time the accident occurred, the driver
was only driving between 10-15 miles per hour and the road surface was dry.
Id. It was later determined that the car's gear box was broken. Id. The plaintiff
claimed that the gear box, which was made of aluminum 380, broke as a result
of metal fatigue, which caused the car to drive off the road. The defendant, on
the other hand, contended that the accident resulted from either a collapse of
the road or negligence of the driver, and that the gear box broke as a result of
the accident. Id. The defendant started making the gear box out of malleable
iron instead of aluminum 380 about three years after the occurrence of the
accident. Id.
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the automobile as theories of recovery.44 During the trial,
evidence was admitted which showed that three years after the
accident, the defendant changed the composition of the car's gear
box, which allegedly caused the accident. 45 On appeal, the
defendant contended that the admission of this evidence was in
error as it violated section 1151 of the California Evidence Code,
which excludes evidence of remedial measures to prove
negligence or culpable conduct. 46 The California Supreme Court
disagreed with the defendant's assertions that strict products
liability was included in the term 'culpable conduct' used in
section 1151.47
In an en banc opinion, the California Supreme Court held that
48
section 1151 did not apply to strict products liability actions. It
reasoned that neither negligence nor culpable conduct are
elements of strict products liability and if the legislature wanted
to include strict products liability in the statute, it would have
used a term other than 'culpable conduct.' 49 It further stated that
nothing in the legislative history of the statute indicated that it
was meant to include strict products liability. 50 In addition, the
public' policy proposition on which the rule is based did not relate
51
to strict products liability actions.
44. Id. at 1149. The plaintiff contended that the gear box of the automobile

was defective because it was made out of aluminum 380 instead of malleable
iron. Id. at 1150.
45. Id.

46. Id. International Harvester Company asserted that the theory of strict
liability was encompassed in the term 'culpable conduct' that is used in section
1151 of the California Evidence Code. Id.
47. Id. at 1151.
48. Id. at 1150.
49. Id. at 1150-51.
50. Id. at 1150.

51. Id. The court acknowledged that the public policy of encouraging
manufacturers to make changes and repairs to products after the occurrence of
an accident applied in full force to actions based on negligence. Id. at 1151.
According to the court, however, this policy does not extend to strict products

liability actions. Id. at 1150. The court reasoned that:
The contemporary corporate mass producer of goods, the normal

products liability defendant, manufactures tens of thousands of units of
goods; it is manifestly unrealistic to suggest that such a producer will

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss1/15
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Even though this brand new issue came into the public light
before the Federal Rules of Evidence went into effect, Congress
chose not to change Rule 407 to either affirm or deny its
application to the area of strict products liability and left the
interpretation to the federal courts.

II. DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF FEDERAL
RULE OF EVIDENCE 407
A. Negligence and Culpable Conduct v. Strict ProductsLiability
Conduct constituting negligence is explicitly covered by
Federal Rule of Evidence 407.52 Negligence is defined as "the
failure to use such care as a reasonably prudent and careful
person would use under similar circumstances." 53 In order to
establish a cause of action based on negligence, four elements
must be proven. 54 These elements are duty, 55 breach of that
duty, 56 proximate cause 57 and damage. 58 The first two elements
of negligence are important here. These elements refer to the fact
that the defendant has done something wrong to deserve to be
forego making improvements in its product, and risk innumerable
additional lawsuits and the attendant adverse effect upon itspublic
image, simply because evidence of adoption of such improvement may
be admitted in an action founded on strict liability for recovery on an
injury that preceded the improvement.
Id. at 1152.
52. See supra note 1.
53. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1032 (6th ed. 1990).
54. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON

ON THE LAW OF

TORTS § 30, at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
55. Id. at 164. Duty consists of "[ani ...obligation, recognized by law,
requiring the person to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the
protection of others against unreasonable risks." Id.
56. Id. Breach consists of "jal failure on the person's part to conform to
the standard required." Id.
57. Id. at 165. Proximate cause consists of "lal reasonably close causal
connection between the conduct and the resulting injury." Id.
58. Id. Damage consists of "[aictual loss or damage resulting to the
interests of another." Id.
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held liable for his actions, whether it be inattention, inadvertence
or thoughtlessness.59
The term 'culpable conduct,' which is also included in Rule
407, has similar implications. 60 The definition of culpable
conduct states that "[s]uch conduct normally involves something
more than simple negligence and implies conduct which is
blamable, censurable, involving the breach of a legal duty or the
commission of a fault." 6 1 This term also implies that the person
involved in culpable conduct has engaged in some kind of
62
wrongdoing for which liability will be imposed.
Strict liability, on the other hand, is defined as "[liability
without fault." 63 The theory of strict liability is that the
defendant is involved in conduct which is atypical of the conduct
normally engaged in by people in his community, which places
potential plaintiffs at a higher risk of danger. 64 Strict liability is
also a category that falls under products liability. 65 Strict
products liability is applicable to manufacturers as well as other
vendors who are responsible for placing products in the stream of
commerce. 66 It arises when either a manufacturer or a vendor has
sold a product that turns out to be more dangerous than expected
and injures a consumer or a bystander. 67 There are two basic
policy reasons for holding a manufacturer or vendor strictly
liable for any damages caused by a dangerous product. First,
these entities are better equipped to bear the expense of the
damages caused by the dangerous product. 68 Second, the amount
of accidents will be reduced if negligence does not have to be

59. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1032 (6th ed. 1990).

60. Id.at 379.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.at 1422.
64. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 54, § 75, at 537.
65. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 54, § 98, at 692.
66. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 54, § 98, at 692.
67. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 54, § 95, at 677.
68. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 54, § 98, at 692-93. ("The costs of
damaging events due to defectively dangerous products can best be borne by
the enterprisers who make and sell these products.").
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proven in order for a cause of action to exist. 69 Furthermore,
because it is sometimes difficult to prove either negligence or

fault in these types of cases, the requirement that either be proven

70
should be eliminated.
The argument as to whether strict products liability should be
included under Federal Rule of Evidence 407 stems from the fact
that the term is not specifically referred to in Rule 407.71 The
questions that need to be answered to decide this issue include

whether Congress intended

strict products

liability to be

encompassed under the term 'culpable conduct,'

whether the

policy reasons behind Rule 407 apply as strongly to strict
products liability and should therefore extend Rule 407 to cover
this type of conduct, and whether there is some other reason that
would justify extending the exclusionary rule to cover strict
products liability cases.
B. Minority View: No Strict ProductsLiability
The minority view followed by two federal circuits is that Rule
407 does not apply to strict products liability cases. In Herndon

v. Seven Bar Flying Service, Inc.,72 an airplane crash took the
lives of a flying instructor and his student. 7 3 A defectively

69. See KEETON Er AL., supra note 54, § 98, at 693. ("The cause of
accident prevention can be promoted by the adoption of strict liability and the
elimination of the necessity for proving negligence.").
70. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 54, § 98, at 693.
It has been said that even if fault or negligence were regarded as the
primary justification for the imposition of liability on a manufacturer or
other seller for the costs of accidents attributable to defective products,
it is often present but difficult to prove, and for institutional reasons and
because of the costs of litigation, proof of the existence of fault or
negligence in the sale of a defective product should no longer be
required.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 55, § 98, at 693.
71. See supra note 1.
72. 716 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 958 (1984).
73. Id. at 1324.
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designed pitch trim switch allegedly caused the accident. 74 The
composition of the pitch trim switch was later changed by the

manufacturer of the airplane and one year after the occurrence of
the accident, a notice was sent to all aircraft owners, instructing

them to make this change in the planes they already had in their

76
possession. 75 This evidence was admitted at trial.
The Tenth Circuit asserted that the policies in favor of

exclusion of subsequent remedial measures 77 do not apply to
actions

based

on

strict

products

liability. 78

The

court

distinguished negligence from strict products liability by stating
that the conduct of the defendant is the issue in negligence cases
while in strict liability cases, the issue is the product and whether
or not it was defective. 7 9 Consequently, since the defendant's

conduct is not at issue in an action based on strict products
liability, there is no reason for it to be excluded using Rule
407.80 The Tenth Circuit also stated that evidence of subsequent
remedial measures was relevant to the proceedings based on
Federal Rule of Evidence 40181 because it could lead the jury to
believe that the product in question was indeed in a defective
condition before the change was made. 82 The court read Rule
407 to exclude no evidence other than that which would be used
74. Id. The pitch trim switch was allegedly being used by the pilot to
maintain the altitude of the plane when it became stuck and caused the plane to
lose altitude and crash. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1325-26. The notice sent out by the defendant telling owners to
modify the pitch trim switch was contained in Piper Service Bulletin 527. The
defendant argued that evidence of this bulletin was inadmissible under Rule
407 because it was a subsequent remedial measure. Plaintiffs contended that
Rule 407 did not apply because this was a strict products liability case and the
evidence was relevant. Id. at 1324-25.
77. See supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
78. Herndon, 716 F.2d at 1328.
79. Id. at 1327.
80. Id. at 1328.
81. FED. R. EvID. 401. This rule states that "'Irlelevant evidence' means
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence." Id.
82. Herndon, 716 F.2d at 1328.
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as proof of negligent or culpable conduct on the part of the
defendant. 83 It also stated that if there is any other reason for
which the evidence could be used, the rule should not apply and
the evidence should be admissible. 8 4 The Tenth Circuit has

reaffirmed Herndon in subsequent decisions. 85
The Eighth Circuit also interpreted Rule 407 to exclude only

evidence that would have a tendency to prove negligence or
culpable conduct. In Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal
Ass'n, 8 6 the Eighth Circuit applied the rationale of Ault, 8 7 which

held that Rule 407 did not apply to actions based on strict
products liability, and thus decided that evidence of a subsequent
remedial warning was admissible to prove the product was
unreasonably dangerous and defective and the defendant should
be held strictly liable for the plaintiffs injury. 8 8 The court also

83. Id. at 1331.
84. Id. See Rimkus v. Northwest Colo. Ski Corp., 706 F.2d 1060 (10th
Cir. 1983). This case was the first in the Tenth Circuit to state that whenever
any other reason exists to admit evidence of subsequent remedial measures,
Rule 407 should not apply, including attempting to prove the plaintiff's
contributory negligence. Id. at 1066.
85. See Huffman v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 908 F.2d 1470, 1481 (10th
Cir. 1990) ("[Tjhis court held that Rule 407 does not apply to strict product
liability cases... [and] [o]ur panel cannot overrule the court's prior
precedent."); Meller v. Heil Co., 745 F.2d 1297, 1301 n.8 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1206 (1984). The court held that:
It strikes the balance, for better or worse, at excluding only that
evidence offered to prove negligence or culpable conduct ... [albsent
evidence that either Congress, which prescribed the rules, the Supreme
Court, which approved the rules, or the Advisory Committee, which
drafted the rules, intended otherwise, we should apply Rule 407 as
written.
Id.
86. 552 F.2d 788 (8th Cir. 1977).
87. 528 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1974).
88. Robbins, 552 F.2d at 793. In this case, many of the plaintiff's cattle
either became sick or died because of an inadequate warning that was on the
defendant's protein supplement for cattle. Id. at 790. Subsequent to this, the
defendant sent a letter to all of its sales people stating that they were to give to
new users of the cattle feed a more severe and restrictive warning, which was
included in the letter. Id. at 792. Evidence of this letter was admitted at trial
by the plaintiff in order to prove their theory of strict products liability. Id.
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made the determination that the subsequent warning was relevant
to the case because it could prove that the product was in fact
unreasonably dangerous, and that the harm would not have come
about if that warning had been given in the first place. 89
The Eighth Circuit has, however, relaxed its view and has
applied Rule 407 to certain products liability actions. 90 In
DeLuryea v. Winthrop Laboratory,91 the court recognized that it
previously held that Rule 407 did not apply to suits based on
strict products liability. 92 However, this case was based on the
defendant's failure to give an adequate warning under a strict
products liability theory. 93 The court disagreed with the

reasoning advanced in Robbins by stating that when the issue of
the case is failure to give an adequate warning, there is
essentially no distinction between negligence and strict products
liability theories. 94 Quoting Werner v. Upjohn Co.,95 DeLuryea
stated that the issue in a case based on failure to give an adequate
89. Id. at 794.
90. DeLuryea v. Winthrop Lab., 697 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1983).
91. Id. This case came about when the plaintiff became severely ill as a
result of ingesting medication that was manufactured by the defendant. Id. at
223-24. After the plaintiff discontinued using the drug, the defendant
manufacturer added further warnings to the drug's package insert about side
effects that could appear as a result of taking the drug. Id. at 227-28. Evidence
of this subsequent warning was admitted at trial. Id.
92. Id. at 228 (citing Robbins, 552 F.2d 788).
93. DeLuryea, 697 F.2d at 223-24.
94. Id. at 228-29.
95. 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981). In
this case, the Fourth Circuit stated:
Our conclusion is supported by the close similarity between negligence
and strict liability. The elements of both are the same with the exception
that in negligence plaintiff must show a breach of a duty of due care by
defendant while in strict liability plaintiff must show the product was
unreasonably dangerous. The distinction between the two lessens
considerably in failure to warn cases .... [U]nder a negligence theory
the issue is whether the defendant exercised due care in formulating and
updating the warning, while under a strict liability theory the issue is
whether the lack of proper warning made the product unreasonably
dangerous. Though phrased differently the issue under either theory is
essentially the same: was the warning adequate?
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warning, whether based on negligence or strict products liability,
turns out to .be the same - whether or not the warning was
adequate. 96 Consequently, the Eighth Circuit stated that the
answer is based on the defendant's conduct and whether the
defendant was reasonable in issuing the original warning. 97 Since
the focus is on the conduct of the defendant, the Eighth Circuit
asserted that this is an area in which strict products liability does
encompass negligence or culpable conduct. 98 As a result, it held
Rule 407 should apply in products liability actions based on
failure to give an adequate warning. 99
Even though the Eighth Circuit continues to follow the
minority view that Rule 407 does not apply to cases based on
strict products liability, 100 as time passes it seems to be more
willing to make exceptions and apply the rule to exclude evidence
of subsequent remedial measures in these types of actions. 10 1 In a
footnote from a recent 1993 decision, the court indicated it may
no longer be wise to continue to refrain from applying Rule 407
to strict products liability actions and implied that it would like to
try and change this rule if presented with a case upon which all
of the circuit judges sat. 102 It would seem, therefore, that even
though the Tenth Circuit firmly stands behind its interpretation,
the Eighth Circuit may be moving towards the majority view.
C. Majority View: Rule 407 Applies to Strict ProductsLiability
The majority view, prevalent in the federal courts, states that
Rule 407 applies to actions based on strict products liability and
subsequent remedial measures taken by defendants should not be

96.
97.
98.
99.

DeLuryea, 697 F.2d at 229.
Id.
Id.
Id.

100. See supra text accompanying notes 86-89.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 90-99.
102. See Burke v. Deere & Co., 6 F.3d 497, 506 n.II (8th Cir. 1993)
("We note, however, that this case illustrates the dangers inherent in our
present approach and further note that it may indeed be wise to revisit the issue
en banc in a proper case."), cert. denied, 1145 S. Ct. 1063 (1994).
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admitted at trial. 10 3 The first case to decide this issue was Roy v.
Star Chopper Co. 104 In this case, the First Circuit briefly stated
that the trial court had not abused its discretion when it excluded

evidence of repairs made to the machine which harmed the
plaintiff. 105 To support this decision, the court cited Rule 407,106
which implies that it interpreted the rule to apply to strict
products liability actions. This implication was affirmed by the
First Circuit in Raymond v. Raymond Corp. 10 7 The court in this
103. See Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518 (1st Cir. 1991)
(holding that Rule 407 is applicable to strict products liability actions);
Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1986) (adopting the position
that strict products liability cases are governed by Rule 407); Flaminio v.
Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that Rule 407 does
apply to cases relying on a theory of strict products liability); Grenada Steel
Indus., Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1983) (following
the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits by deciding that strict
products liability cases are controlled by Rule 407); Hall v. American S.S.
Co., 688 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1982) (stating that the policy behind Rule 407
applies to negligence as well as strict liability); Josephs v. Harris Corp., 677
F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1982) (stating that Federal Rule of Evidence 407 applies to
lawsuits based on strict products liability); Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d
54 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that Rule 407 applies to actions based on strict
products liability), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982); Werner v. Upjohn Co.,
628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that Rule 407 applies to actions based
on strict products liability because a defendant will nonetheless be inclined not
to make subsequent changes in a product even though their conduct is not an
issue in the case), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981).
The only two circuits not mentioned in this discussion are the Eleventh
Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit. Neither of these circuits have
been faced with the issue of whether Rule 407 applies to strict products
liability actions, therefore neither of these circuits have made a ruling on this
issue.
104. 584 F.2d 1124 (Ist Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979).
This case involved a strict products liability action that arose when the plaintiff
was inspecting an electroplating machine that was manufactured by the
defendant. In the course of her inspection, the plaintiff's hand became stuck in
the machine and as a result wound up severely deformed. Id. at 1128. There
were repairs made to the machine after the accident which were not allowed
into evidence by the trial court. Id. at 1134.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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case reiterated the policy reasons advanced in favor of the rule 108
and distinctly stated that Rule 407 applies to actions based on
strict products liability. 109 The First Circuit continues to follow
this rule and has even specified that Rule 407 additionally applies
to products liability actions that arise from an express
110
warranty.
The Third Circuit also ruled on this issue with minimal
discussion. In Josephs v. Harris Corp., I l l the court held that
Rule 407 is applicable to lawsuits based on products liability, as
long as one of the exceptions stated in Rule 407112 is not offered

107. 938 F.2d 1518 (lst Cir. 1991). The court stated: "The First Circuit,
however, has at least impliedly accepted [Rule 407's] application in this
context ....We now explicitly hold that Fed. R. Evid. 407 applies to strict
liability cases." Id. at 1522. This case involved a strict products liability cause
of action based on a defectively designed and manufactured sideloader that was
manufactured by the defendant. Id. The trial court refused to allow the plaintiff
to admit evidence that the defendant added a more secure welding and a
backplate to the sideloader after this accident occurred, which the plaintiff
wanted to use as proof that the machine was dangerous and defective. Id.
108. Id. at 1523.
109. Id. at 1522.
110. See Prentiss & Carlisle Co., Inc. v. Koehring-Waterous Div. of

Timberjack, Inc., 972 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1992). The focus of this case was an
allegedly defective timber harvesting machine made by the defendant which
went up in flames as a result of the defect. Id. at 7-8. The machine came with
an express warranty that it was defect free. Id. at 8. After the accident, the
defendant issued an interoffice memo and sent a letter to owners of the
machine that there was a cable that had the capability of becoming exposed and
that it should be rerouted. Id. at 9. The court assumed that since Rule 407
applied to strict products liability actions, it also applied to actions based on
express warranty. Id. at 10.
111. 677 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1982).
112. See supra note 1.
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by the plaintiff. 113 This view has been ratified by other Third
114
Circuit cases.
The first circuit to present a detailed discussion on the issue of
whether Rule 407 applies to suits based on products liability was
the Fourth Circuit in Werner v. Upjohn Co. 115 When the court
began its analysis, it stated that even though Rule 407 does not
specifically mention strict products liability, that does not mean
evidence of subsequent remedial measures should be admissible
to prove the defendant's liability in a strict products liability
suit. 116 The court then stated that in order to determine if strict

products liability is covered by the rule, the policy reasons must
be analyzed according to strict liability rather than negligence to
117
see if they apply with equal force.
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged a difference between
negligence and strict liability. 118 However, it reasoned that the
113. Josephs, 677 F.2d at 990-91. In this case, the trial court did not allow
the plaintiff to admit evidence that the defendant sent out a letter with
instructions on how to clean their printing press with a warning sticker after
the plaintiff was injured by the press. Id. at 990. The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit affirmed this decision based on the fact that in its interpretation,
Rule 407 is applicable to products liability suits. Id. at 991.
114. See, e.g., Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1992)
(stating that although the language in Rule 407 states that subsequent remedial
measures are inadmissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct, the Third
Circuit has continually decided that the rule applies to actions based on strict
products liability); Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, Inc., 887 F.2d 34 (3d Cir.
1989) (reaffirming the Third Circuit's position that strict products liability
actions are encompassed by Rule 407).
115. 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981).
This case arose when the plaintiff developed a condition known as pseudo
membranous colitis as a result of ingesting a medication manufactured by the
defendant, Upjohn Co. Id. at 851. The trial court allowed the introduction of
the evidence of a warning published by the defendant after the plaintiff was
diagnosed with colitis, despite the defendant's objection. Id. at 853. The
appellate court vacated and remanded the case based on. its decision that the
admission of the subsequent warning was improper because Rule 407 applies to
strict products liability actions and thus, this kind of evidence should have been
deemed inadmissible. Id.
116. Id. at 856.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 856-57.
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distinction was not so great as to allow Rule 407 to be applied to
negligence actions and not strict products liability actions. 119 The
court held that the policy of encouraging manufacturers to change
and improve their products, even after an accident had occurred,
was a valid policy for strict products liability as well as for
negligence suits. 120 Judge Widener in his opinion wrote:
It is difficult to understand why this policy should apply any
differently where the complaint is based on strict liability as well
as negligence. From a defendant's point of view it is the fact that
the evidence may be used against him which will inhibit
subsequent repairs or improvement. It also makes no difference
to the defendant on what theory the evidence is admitted; his
inclination to make subsequent improvements will be similarly
repressed. 121

The court rejected the reasoning in Ault by stating that the
California Supreme Court was not successful in distinguishing
between causes of action based on negligence and strict products
liability. 122 It also reasoned that not applying Rule 407 to strict
products liability actions might do away with the rule altogether,
as it could then be possible to apply that rationale to negligence
cases. 123
The Fourth Circuit in Werner advanced another policy reason
for applying Rule 407 to strict products liability actions. It
reasoned that strict products liability suits concern actions that
are much less reprehensible than either negligence or culpable
conduct. 124 Therefore, because more contemptuous behavior is
protected by the rule that excludes evidence of subsequent
remedial measures, it is only logical that the rule immunize the
119. Id. As mentioned previously, the court in this case also stated that the

distinction between negligence and strict products liability becomes even more
narrow in a case based on failure to give an adequate warning. In that
situation, whether the theory is negligence or strict products liability, the
ultimate question that must be answered is whether the warning was adequate.
Id. at 858.
120. Id. at 857.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 857-58.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 857.
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defendant in an action where his fault need not be proven. 125
Werner, and the Fourth Circuit, hold that Rule 407 applies to
actions based on strict products liability as well as negligence. 126
The Sixth Circuit in Hall v. American Steamship Co.,127
agreed with the reasoning in Werner. 12 8 In this case, the court
held that even though the claim against the defendant that a vessel
was unseaworthy was a type of strict liability, it nonetheless
included culpable conduct, and consequently Rule 407 did apply

125. Id. at 856-57. The court stated:
Culpable conduct normally involves something more than simple
negligence and implies conduct which is "blamable; censurable;
involving the breach of a legal duty or the commission of a
fault ....
[lt implies that the act or conduct spoken of is reprehensible
or wrong, but not that it involves malice or a guilty purpose." Thus,
Congress has determined that such evidence should be excluded not only
in cases involving negligence but where the defendant is charged with
culpable conduct. Strict liability on the other hand involves conduct
which is technically less blameworthy than simple negligence, since the
plaintiff need not prove a breach of duty by the defendant other than
placing the product on the market. From a policy standpoint it follows
that if the rule expressly excludes evidence of subsequent repairs to
prove culpable conduct that the same should be true for strict liability.
Id. (citations omitted).
126. Id. at 857. See Chase v. General Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 17 (4th Cir.
1988). The subject of this suit was a car manufactured by the defendant that
the plaintiff had been a passenger in when it crashed as a result of defectively
designed brakes. Id. at 18. After the accident, the defendant sent a recall letter
to the plaintiff stating that its brakes needed to be adjusted. Id. at 21. The letter
was not admitted at trial, but evidence of the recall was. Id. The appellate
court held that this evidence was wrongfully admitted and remanded the case to
the trial court. Id. The court ratified the decision in Werner when it stated that
this case follows the decision of applying Rule 407 to actions based on strict
products liability as well as negligence. Id. at 22.
127. 688 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1982). The case was based on the
unseaworthiness of a vessel. Id. at 1063. The plaintiff in this case was injured
when he was on the deck to do the job of hosing it off, as required by ship
policy, during rough weather conditions. Id. After the plaintiff's injury, the
defendant changed its policy and no longer required its employees to hose off
the deck in rough weather conditions. Id. at 1066. This policy change was
admitted at trial over the objections of the defense. Id. at 1064.
128. Id. at 1062.
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to exclude evidence of a subsequent policy change. 129 This
reasoning implies that it is possible for actions based on strict
products liability to encompass a certain amount of culpable
conduct which would call for the application of Rule 407. This
implication was confirmed by the Sixth Circuit in Bryan v.
Emerson Electric Co., Inc. 130
Based on the policy reasons advanced by the Advisory
Committee for Rule 407, the Seventh Circuit also supports the
13 1
application of the rule to strict products liability actions.
Flaminio v.' Honda Motor Co., Ltd. 132 was a products liability
case instituted after the plaintiff's involvement in an accident
while driving a motorcycle manufactured by the defendant. 133
The plaintiff alleged that the front tire of the motorcycle suddenly
began to wobble, causing it to crash. 134 During the trial, the
court refused to allow the plaintiff to admit evidence of
blueprints, created after the accident, which tended to prove the
defendant was going to make the motorcycle struts two
millimeters thicker to prevent the wobble from occurring. 135 The
court held that the evidence was properly excluded. 136
Before making its decision on the applicability of Rule 407, the
Seventh Circuit in Flaminio considered the views adopted by
other circuits. 137 The court disagreed with the assertion that Rule
407 does not apply to strict products liability actions since
reference to this type of suit is not contained specifically in the

129. Id. at 1066.
130. 1988 WL 90910 (6th Cir. 1988). In this products liability case,

plaintiff was injured by defendant's defectively designed ladder. After the
accident, the defendant recalled all of the ladders and replaced the defective
part. Id. at *1. The court of appeals held that the evidence of this subsequent
change was properly excluded by the trial court, based on the decision that
Rule 407 applied to strict products liability suits. Id. at *2.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1984).
Id.
Id. at 465.
Id.
Id. at 468.
Id. at 470.
Id. at 468-69.
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rule. 138 The court reiterated the policy of encouraging
manufacturers to repair their products. 139 It reasoned that since
accidents do not happen very often, some defendants might risk
future lawsuits by not repairing the product to avoid the evidence
from being used against them in court because the probability of
a lawsuit is higher than the probability of another accident. 140
The court further stated that in a products liability case, it is
possible that the injury could have been avoided by issuing a
stronger warning or curing a defect in the product. 14 1 If this is
true, not applying Rule 407 could wind up dissuading the
defendant from making make a much needed change in the
product, which would defeat the purpose of Rule 407.142
Therefore, the court held that Rule 407 is applicable to strict
14 3
products liability actions.
The Ninth Circuit followed the Seventh Circuit's line of
reasoning when it decided Gauthier v. AMF, Inc. 144 In Gauthier,
the court was influenced by the rationale of Flaminio, concluding
138. Id. at 469.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 470.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 469. See Probus v. K-Mart, Inc., 794 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir.
1986). In this case the court stated:
It is also inconsistent with Rule 407 to admit evidence of a change in the
plastic end caps to raise the inference that the defendants had recognized
the inadequacy of the plastic used at the time the plaintiff purchased the
ladder. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in
excluding the evidence offered by the plaintiff of the use of another
material in the end caps defendants manufactured and sold.
Id. at 1210 (citations omitted).
144. 788 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1986). This case involved a products liability
cause of action based on defective design. Id. at 635. The plaintiff received
injuries to his hand when he tried to unclog his snow thrower that was
manufactured by the defendant. Id. The plaintiff admitted evidence of safety
devices utilized on another brand of snow thrower to try and prove defendant's
liability. Id. at 636. This evidence was apparently utilized to demonstrate
subsequent remedial measures to the jury. Id. The court held that this evidence
should not have been admitted because Rule 407 applies to cases based on
strict products liability. Id. at 637-38.
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that there was no substantial difference between negligence and
strict products liability regarding this issue, and the policy of

motivating manufacturers to make changes in their products
applied to strict products liability.14 5 Thus, the court concluded
that Rule 407 was applicable to actions based on strict products
liability. 146
The two remaining circuits, the Second and the Fifth, also hold

that Rule 407 applies to strict products liability cases, but their
reasoning differs from the rest of the circuits. In Cann v. Ford
Motor Co., 147 the Second Circuit stated that subsequent warnings

and design changes must be looked at in terms of Federal Rule of
Evidence 403148 in order to determine their admissibility at

trial. 149 In addition, the court stated that the issue of
admissibility of a subsequent design change is directly affected by
Rule 407.150 The court agreed and expanded upon the reasoning

in Werner.15 1 It stated that negligence and strict products liability
actions are similar, due to the fact that if the defendant loses, he
has to pay, regardless of whether the focus of the case is on the

product (as in strict products liability) or on the defendant (as in
negligence).1 52 Additionally, it stated that the evidence would be
145. Id.at 637.
146. Id.
147. 658 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982). This
action arose when the plaintiff was injured as a result of a problem with the
gear shifting mechanism of a car manufactured by the defendant. The car was
put into "park" by one of the plaintiffs, but it then went into reverse and
injured the passenger as she was trying to get out of the car. Id. at 56.
Subsequent to the accident, the defendant changed the design of the
transmission and included a warning about the problem in the owner's manual.
The trial court would not allow these changes to be presented into evidence at
trial. Id.at 59. The appellate court affirmed this decision. Id.
148. FED. R. EvID. 403. This rule states that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence." Id.
149. Cann, 658 F.2d at 59.
150. Id.
151. Id.at 60.
152. Id.
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prejudicial to the defendant despite the theory used, and could
result in the defendant's failure to take necessary remedial
measures to produce a safe product. 153 The court established that
strict products liability is encompassed in Rule 407.154
The Fifth Circuit in Grenada Steel Industries, Inc. v. Alabama
Oxygen Co. 155 came to the conclusion that Rule 407 is applicable
to strict products liability suits. 15 6 However, its decision was not
based on the common policy reasons advanced by the other
circuits. 157 The court, on the other hand, stated that evidence of
subsequent remedial measures was not relevant in a product
liability action and therefore the rule is applicable. 158 It noted
that this evidence had no bearing on whether or not the product
had been defective. 159 The Fifth Circuit stated that there was no
way for a court to know the reason why a manufacturer changed
his product, and the focus of the case instead should be whether
the product was defective when it was sold. 160 Evidence from
after the accident would only confuse the jury, causing them to
focus on what happened after, rather than on what happened
prior to the occurrence of the accident. 16 1 It therefore held that
the rule applied to strict products liability actions. 162 This

153. Id.
154. Id. See Fish v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 779 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1985)

(holding that a warning given after an event that injured the plaintiff qualified
as a subsequent remedial measure as stated in Rule 407 and since the rule
includes actions based on strict products liability, the evidence should have
been excluded).
155. 695 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1983).
156. Id. at 888. This case dealt with a products liability suit that arose when
a cylinder containing gas provided by the defendant to the plaintiff allegedly

containing a defective valve developed a leak and eventually caused a fire and
an explosion in the plaintiffs plant. Id. at 884-85. The trial court excluded
evidence that the defendant eventually stopped making this type of valve and
adopted an alternative design instead. Id. at 885.
157. Id. at 887.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.at 888.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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holding was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit in Hardy v. Chentron
63
Corp.1

Despite the various reasons advanced in favor of the
application of Rule 407 to strict products liability actions, it is
clear that the majority of the circuits agree with such
applications. 164 Since it appears that the Eighth Circuit may
embrace the majority view in the near future, 165 the Tenth
Circuit might be the only circuit to hold that Rule 407 should not
166
apply to this type of lawsuit.

mH.

THE NEW YORK RULE

A. Development of the New York Conmon Law Rule
New York State courts do not follow the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The state never legislatively established an evidence
rule that specifically deals with the issue of whether subsequent
remedial measures should be admissible in products liability
cases. New York follows a common law rule that has been
established by the New York Court of Appeals.
The Appellate Division, Second Department first faced this
issue in Barry v. Manglass.167 The court reiterated the longtime
163. 870 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1989). In this products liability action, the
court stated that Rule 407 was applicable to lawsuits based on negligence as
well as strict products liability. Id. at 1010.
164. See cases cited supra note 103.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 90-99.
166. This is assuming that when the Eleventh and D.C. circuits finally rule
on this issue, they will follow the majority's interpretation. The United States
District Court for the District of Columbia in Dine v. Western Erterminaiing
Co., stated that it is "persuaded by the majority" even though the issue was not
essential to the outcome of the case. 1988 WL 28241 (D. D.C. Mar. 16,
1988).
167. 55 A.D.2d 1, 389 N.Y.S.2d 870 (2d Dep't 1976). In this case, the
plaintiff was injured when the car she was a passenger in was struck by a car
that went out of control which was manufactured by General Motors and
allegedly defective. Id. at 3, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 872. After the accident, General
Motors sent out two recall letters that were admitted as evidence at trial despite
the defense's objection. Id. at 4, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 873.
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rule that evidence of subsequent remedial measures made by a
168
defendant is inadmissible in cases based on negligence.
However, the court also held that the evidence is admissible in
products liability actions. 169 It distinguished the two theories of
liability by stating that negligence deals with the conduct of the
defendant, while products liability deals with the product
itself. 170 The court then stated that the rule should not be applied
to products liability suits because the conduct of the manufacturer
is not at issue in this type of lawsuit. 171 The court also stated that
this type of evidence in a products liability case might prove that
the product is in fact defective, and therefore is relevant to the
case, which may be more important than any bias it may cause
the defendant. 172
The New York Court of Appeals seemed to relax this holding
in Caprara v. Chrysler Corp. 173 The products liability aspect of
this action was submitted to the jury based on the theory that
there was a defect in manufacturing. 174 The court, in an opinion
written by Judge Fuchsberg, held that evidence of a subsequent
change in a product made by a manufacturer was in fact
admissible in a strict products liability case involving a
manufacturing defect. 175 The court stated that there was an
enormous difference between the theories of negligence and strict
products liability. 176 It discussed how strict products liability had
been adopted to alleviate the plaintiff's burden of proving the

168. Id. at 7, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 875.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 10, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
173. 52 N.Y.2d 114, 417 N.E.2d 545, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1981). This
case, based on theories of products liability and negligence, arose out of a car
accident in which the plaintiff-was injured as a result of a defect in design and
manufacture. Id. at 118, 417 N.E.2d at 547, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 252. Evidence
of a subsequent design change was admitted into evidence at trial. id. at 119,
417 N.E.2d at 547, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 253.
174. Id. at 120, 417 N.E.2d at 548, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 253.
175. Id. at 126, 417 N.E.2d at 551, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
176. Id.
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defendant was aware of the defect. 177 It reasoned that a rule
providing for liability without fault was probably not meant to be
subjected to another rule that would exclude evidence of
subsequent changes in the product which would ultimately be
irrelevant to the issue of liability. 178 The court, however,
stressed that this decision did not include an answer to the
question of whether this kind of evidence would be admissible in
a strict products liability action based on a defect in the design of

a product. 179
In Cover v. Cohen, 180 New York finally decided the issue of
admissibility of subsequent remedial measures in a design defect
case. 18 1 In this case, the New York Court of Appeals held that
although this type of evidence was admissible in a strict products
liability case based on a manufacturing defect, it was not
admissible in such a case based on a design defect or failure to
give an adequate warning. 18 2 The decision was based upon the
Appellate Division, Fourth Department's reasoning in Rainbow
v. Albert Elia Building Co., Inc. 183 The court in Rainbow stated
that actions based on negligence are similar to strict products
liability cases based on a design defect because the issue of
whether or not a design was defective is based on an analysis of
risk versus utility, which fundamentally turns out to be a
negligence test. 184 Therefore, the court in Cover held that the
exclusionary rule should be applied to strict products liability
185
suits based on design defects.

177. Id. at 123-25, 417 N.E.2d at 549-51, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 255-56.
178. Id. at 124-25, 417 N.E.2d at 550, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
179. Id. at 126, 417 N.E.2d at 551, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
180. 61 N.Y.2d 261, 461 N.E.2d 864, 473 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1984).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 270, 461 N.E.2d at 868, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 382.
183. 79 A.D.2d 287, 436 N.Y.S.2d 480 (4th Dep't 1981), aff'd, 56 N.Y.2d
550, 434 N.E.2d 1345, 449 N.Y.S.2d 967 (1982).
184. Id. at 292-93, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 484.
185. Cover, 61 N.Y.2d at 270, 461 N.E.2d at 868, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 382.
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B. New York Rule in Relation to the FederalInterpretations
The common law rule adopted in New York does not fall
within the interpretations of Federal Rule of Evidence 407
advanced by the federal circuits. Rule 407, along with New
York's common law rule, states explicitly that evidence of
subsequent remedial measures is not admissible at trial to prove
the negligence or culpable conduct of a defendant. 186 When
deciding whether or not the rule applies to actions based on strict
products liability, neither the majority nor the minority of the
circuit courts distinguished between cases based on a design
defect and cases based on a manufacturing defect. The majority
of circuits have decided that Rule 407 applies to all strict
products liability cases 187 and the minority have decided that the
rule is inapplicable to all cases based on a theory of strict
products liability. 18 8 New York, however, holds that subsequent
remedial measures are admissible in manufacturing defect
cases 189 and inadmissible in design defect cases. 190 Moreover,
this distinction made by the New York courts does not seem to
fall in line with the policy reasons for the enactment of Rule 407.
If the main purpose behind Rule 407 is to encourage
manufacturers to change and improve their products, it seems
likely that they will refrain from making these changes if the
changes can be used against them by a plaintiff at trial. The
manufacturers will not be concerned with distinguishing what
type of action is being brought against them. Rather, they will
simply decline to make the changes for fear that it will be used to
prove their liability. The best interpretation of Rule 407, if the
policies for Rule 407 are to be advanced, is that Rule 407 should
apply to actions based on strict products liability, in order to
prevent evidence of subsequent remedial measures from being
admitted at trial.

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

See
See
See
See
See

supra note 1.
cases cited supra note 103.
supra text accompanying notes 72-89.
supra text accompanying note 175.
supra text accompanying note 182.
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CONCLUSION

There is clearly a split in the federal circuit courts concerning
whether Federal Rule of Evidence 407 is applicable to cases
based on strict products liability, which would exclude evidence
of remedial measures taken by a defendant after an accident,
from being admitted at trial. The majority, consisting of eight
circuits, hold that Rule 407 is applicable to these types of
actions. 19 1 The minority, consisting of two circuits, hold that
Rule 407 does not apply in these situations. 192 New York,
however, holds that the evidence is admissible in strict products
liability actions based on manufacturing defects but is
inadmissible in the same type of action based on design
defects. 193 While it might seem that each federal circuit and each
state is entitled to adopt its own determination as to which
interpretation or which rule to follow, a problem does arise as a
result of this vast array of decisions. It is quite possible that these
different interpretations could lead to forum shopping on the part
of the plaintiff, as well as the defendant, when a suit of this
nature is commenced. The plaintiff may bring the suit in one
court because the law followed by that court states that the
evidence is allowable. The defendant might then try to remove or
transfer the case to a court that does not permit admission of this
evidence. A waste of judicial time and resources as well as
confusion would result in deciding these threshold issues. A
possible solution to this possible dilemma would be the creation
of a uniform rule that state as well as federal courts could adopt.
However, since 1974, there has yet to be a uniform principal
established by the courts regarding this issue, and as such it
appears that the split will remain.

PatriciaA. Brass

191. See supra text accompanying notes 103-63.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 72-89.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 173-85.
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